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OUT OF AFRICA: TOWARD REGIONAL 
SOLUTIONS FOR INTERNAL 
DISPLACEMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
 startling 830,000 people were internally displaced 1  in   
2011 as a consequence of the Arab Spring2 uprisings that 
transformed the political landscape of the Arab region.3 That 
number represents a six-fold increase in displacement4 from 
the previous year.5 The displaced population rose even more 
                                                                                                             
 1. This Note adopts the definition of internally displaced persons (“IDPs”) 
used by both the United Nations (“U.N.”) and the African Union (“AU”). Ac-
cording to that definition, IDPs are “persons or groups of persons who have 
been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual res-
idence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed 
conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or nat-
ural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally 
recognized State border.” UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF 
HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT ¶ 2 
(2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT], 
available at https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/Guiding 
PrinciplesDispl.pdf. While it is not binding law, this instrument is recognized 
to “reflect and [be] consistent with international human rights law and inter-
national humanitarian law.” Id. ¶ 3. 
 2. The term “Arab Spring” is widely used to refer to the popular uprisings 
that spread through the Middle East and North Africa beginning in February 
2011 with the revolution in Tunisia. See Adrien K. Wing, The “Arab Fall”: 
The Future of Women’s Rights, 18 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 445 (2012). 
The uprisings have been described as “regional grassroots movements seek-
ing democracy and greater respect for human rights.” Id. at 446; see also 
Fouad Ajami, The Arab Spring at One: A Year of Living Dangerously, 91 
FOREIGN AFF. 56, 56 (2012) (discussing the Arab Spring more generally). 
 3. Press Release, Internal Displacement Monitoring Ctr., Conflicts 
Worldwide Uproot Millions; Six-Fold Increase in Middle East (Apr. 19, 2012) 
[hereinafter Conflicts Worldwide Uproot Millions], available at 
http://www.internal-displacement.org/publications/global-overview-press-
release-2011.pdf. “Arab region” is used here to refer to the area comprised of 
“the diverse nations of the Middle East and North African region.” Wing, su-
pra note 2, at 447. 
 4. This Note uses the definition of displacement generally utilized in re-
lated literature, which defines one who is “displaced” as one who has been 
involuntarily or forcibly moved from one’s area of habitual residence. See, 
e.g., Maria Stavropoulou, The Right Not to Be Displaced, 9 AM. U.J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 689, 690 (1993–94). 
 5. Conflicts Worldwide Uproot Millions, supra note 3. 
A
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sharply amid ongoing regional conflict during 2012,6 with 2.5 
million people newly displaced throughout the Middle East and 
North Africa.7 By early 2013, the International Rescue Com-
mittee reported that the situation in the Middle East had be-
come “a human displacement tragedy,” with the Syrian Arab 
Republic (“Syria”) experiencing the most extreme and ongoing 
displacement crisis.8 
Indeed, the number of internally displaced persons (“IDPs”) 
within Syria has grown dramatically since March 2011, when 
civil unrest in the country began. During the course of 2012, as 
the conflict escalated into a recognized civil war,9 displacement 
in Syria rose over twelve times—from an estimated 200,000 
displaced at the beginning of the year10 to a reported 2.5 mil-
lion displaced by the year’s end.11 By July 2013, more than 4.25 
                                                                                                             
 6. Internally Displaced Persons in Syria, INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT 
MONITORING CTR., http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/syria (last 
visited Aug. 30, 2013). 
 7. Internally Displaced Figures, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES 
[UNHCR], http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c23.html (last visited Nov. 14, 
2013). 
 8. Press Release, Int’l Rescue Comm., Syria Displacement Crisis Worsens 
as Protracted Humanitarian Emergency Looms (Jan. 14, 2013), 
http://www.rescue.org/press-releases/syria-displacement-crisis-worsens-
protracted-humanitarian-emergency-looms-15091. 
 9. On July 15, 2012, the International Committee of the Red Cross an-
nounced that the conflict had evolved significantly and its scale had reached 
such proportions that it could be considered a civil war. Accordingly, “hostili-
ties between these parties wherever they may occur in Syria are subject to 
the rules of international humanitarian law.” Syria: ICRC and Syrian Arab 
Red Crescent Maintain Aid Effort amid Increased Fighting, INT’L COMM. OF 
THE RED CROSS [ICRC] (July 17, 2012), 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/update/2012/syria-update-2012-
07-17.htm. For more on the influence of this announcement, see Neil 
MacFarquhar, Syria Denies Attack on Civilians, in Crisis Seen as Civil War, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/16/world/middleeast/syria-denies-use-of-
heavy-weapons-in-deadly-village-fight.html. 
 10. Syria: A Full-Scale Displacement and Humanitarian Crisis with No 
Solutions in Sight, INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CTR. 4 (July 31, 
2012), 
http://www.internaldisplacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/847
4B2AE5164B7DAC1257A4C004B6634/$file/syria-overview-july2012.pdf 
[hereinafter Syria: A Full-Scale Crisis]. 
 11. Internally Displaced Persons in Syria, supra note 6. 
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million Syrians, or roughly 20% of the population,12 were dis-
placed within the country.13 Multiple United Nations agencies 
were then reporting on the urgent humanitarian needs of Syr-
ia’s IDPs,14 and the crisis was dubbed the world’s worst human-
itarian emergency.15 
Toward the end of 2013, the Internal Displacement Monitor-
ing Centre was reporting an internal displacement figure up-
wards of 6 million Syrians,16 a staggering figure amounting to 
more than a quarter of the Syrian population.17 With no appar-
ent end to the conflict in sight at the time of writing,18 dis-
placement was expected to continue to increase19 and the situa-
tion for those already displaced was expected to worsen.20 
                                                                                                             
 12. The reported population of Syria was 21.9 million at the time of writ-
ing. Internally Displaced Persons in Syria, supra note 6. 
 13. 2013 UNHCR Country Operations Profile—Syrian Arab Republic, 
UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486a76.html (last visited Nov. 13, 
2013) [hereinafter UNHCR Country Operations Profile—Syria]; see also Mark 
Tran, Millions of Syrians in Need of Food as War Devastates Food Produc-
tion, GUARDIAN (July 5, 2013), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jul/05/syrian-food-aid-war. Although 
this was the latest estimate at the time of writing, it is acknowledged that 
“accurate figures on internal displacement are increasingly difficult to ascer-
tain due to government imposed restrictions preventing international agen-
cies from reaching displaced populations” in Syria. Internally Displaced Per-
sons in Syria, supra note 6. 
 14. In addition to the World Food Programme (“WFP”) and Food and Agri-
culture Organization of the U.N. (“FAO”) (discussed infra note 16), the World 
Health Organization reported that Syrian authorities had “increasingly 
blocked delivery of medicine and medical supplies around the country . . . 
even as health needs [were] escalating for people trapped in two years of con-
flict.” Hania Mourtada & Nick Cumming-Bruce, State of Siege in Syrian City 
Is Blocking Humanitarian Aid, Health Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/06/world/middleeast/syria.html. 
 15. Tran, supra note 13. 
 16. Syria: A Full-Scale Crisis, supra note 10. 
 17. Internally Displaced Persons in Syria, supra note 6. 
 18. Syria: A Regional Crisis, COMM’N ON SYRIAN REFUGEES, INT’L RESCUE 
COMMITTEE (Jan. 2013), available at 
http://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/resource-
file/IRCReportMidEast20130114.pdf; see also JEREMY M. SHARP & 
CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33487, ARMED 
CONFLICT IN SYRIA: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 2 (2013), available at 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/195385.pdf. 
 19. Erin Banco, U.N. Reports Increased Number of Displaced People, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 18, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/world/middleeast/un-reports-increased-
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The Syrian authorities’ response to the displacement crisis 
within the country’s borders has been wholly inadequate 
throughout the two and a half years of conflict.21 Despite ongo-
ing international recognition of the severity of the displacement 
crisis,22 for the first year of the conflict the Syrian government 
“refused to acknowledge that the country faced a humanitarian 
                                                                                                             
number-of-displaced-people.html. See also Conflicts Worldwide Uproot Mil-
lions, supra note 3. 
 20. In June 2013, U.N. FAO/WFP reported that “[i]f the present conflict 
continues the food security prospects for 2014 could be worse than they are 
now.” FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to the Syrian 
Arab Republic, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG./WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME 8 (July 5, 
2013), available at http://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/faowfp-
crop-and-food-security-assessment-mission-syrian-arab-republic. It was also 
reported that by the end of 2013, the disaster could likely leave half the coun-
try’s population in need of urgent aid. Tran, supra note 13. 
 21. For instance, in February 2012 the U.N. General Assembly adopted a 
resolution condemning the Syrian authorities’ human rights abuses and vio-
lent acts against civilians and requesting it cease interference with the deliv-
ery of humanitarian aid. G.A. Res. 66/253, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/253 (Feb. 16, 
2012). In June 2013, the U.N. Human Rights Council reported that govern-
ment forces and affiliated militia were continuing to commit war crimes and 
crimes against humanity, including the inhumane act of forcible transfer and 
the targeting of IDPs. U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Independ-
ent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 23d 
Sess., May 27–June 14, 2013, ¶¶ 34–35, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/58 (June 4, 
2013). The Syrian “government’s historic inability to tackle displacement 
within the country” has been noted in this regard as well. Press Release, In-
ternal Displacement Monitoring Ctr., Internal Displacement Adds Critical 
Dimension to the Syria Debate (Aug. 16, 2012), available at 
http://www.internaldisplacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/9D
8B8577B60AF792C1257A5D00441674/$file/syria-press-release-aug2012.pdf. 
 22. Throughout the crisis the international press and prominent interna-
tional humanitarian organizations have consistently and frequently reported 
on the dire conditions and drawn attention to the crisis. For example, in Au-
gust 2012, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs called 
for the protection and assistance of current IDPs and a resolution to the con-
flict to prevent further displacement. Syria: Severe Internal Displacement 
Crisis Due to Disregard for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, U.N. 
OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Aug. 9, 2012), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=124
25&LangID=E [hereinafter Syria: Severe Internal Displacement Crisis]. This 
plea has since been made repeatedly with increasing frequency and force by 
U.N. bodies and officials. See, e.g., U.N. Security Council Urges All Sides in 
Syrian Crisis to Immediately Provide Access for Humanitarian Aid, UN NEWS 
CTR. (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=46174 
[hereinafter U.N. Security Council Urges All Sides]. 
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crisis or protection needs.”23 Throughout the unrest, the Syrian 
government has consistently failed to fully cooperate with aid-
giving organizations and other international actors, stymying 
these organizations’ efforts to provide relief to Syria’s IDPs.24 
In the absence of a U.N. Security Council (“Security Council”) 
decision to intervene,25 the international community’s ability to 
                                                                                                             
 23. Syria: A Full-Scale Crisis, supra note 10, at 7. 
 24. Id. at 10. In June 2013, the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Human-
itarian Assistance reported that, “despite significant improvements in recent 
months, aid delivery continues to face various obstacles due to insecurity, 
bureaucratic constraints and insufficient partnerships [with local organiza-
tions].” UN OCHA, REVISED SYRIA HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE RESPONSE PLAN 
(SHARP) (Jan.–Dec. 2013), available at 
http://www.unocha.org/cap/appeals/revised-syria-humanitarian-assistance-
response-plan-sharp-january-december-2013. In October 2013, the U.N. Se-
curity Council, “[g]ravely alarmed, . . . called on Damascus to take immediate 
steps to facilitate the expansion of humanitarian relief operations, and lift 
bureaucratic impediments and other obstacles. . . . Further, the Council 
urged all parties, in particular the Syrian authorities, to take all appropriate 
steps to facilitate the efforts of the UN, its specialized agencies and all hu-
manitarian actors engaged in relief activities, to provide immediate humani-
tarian assistance to the affected people in Syria.” U.N. Security Council Urges 
All Sides, supra note 22. 
 25. During the first year of the conflict, it was reported that “[t]he United 
Nations Security Council has been unable to agree on any actions other than 
issuing weak statements of condemnation.”  Neil MacFarquhar, Arab League 
Votes to Suspend Syria over Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/world/middleeast/arab-league-votes-to-
suspend-syria-over-its-crackdown-on-protesters.html. This has slowly 
changed. Following reports of a chemical weapons attack in August 2013, the 
Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2118, which “called for the 
elimination of the country’s chemical weapons.” UN Security Council Agrees 
to Rid Syria of Chemical Weapons, Endorses Peace Process, UN NEWS CTR. 
(Sept. 27, 2013), available at 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=46103&Cr=Syria&Cr1=. 
The Council, inter alia, “endorse[d] . . . the expeditious destruction of the Syr-
ian Arab Republic’s chemical weapons programme” and “call[ed] for the con-
vening, as soon as possible, of an international conference on Syria to imple-
ment the Geneva Communique.” Security Council Res. 2118, ¶¶ 3, 17, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/2118 (Sept. 27, 2013). The Geneva Communique is a proposed 
political settlement to the Syrian conflict, developed and endorsed in June 
2013 by “the UN-backed Action Group for Syria . . . [, which] comprised the 
UN, Arab League and EU; China, France, Russia, the UK and the US; and 
Turkey, Iraq, Kuwait and Qatar.” The Communique proposes a political set-
tlement to the conflict, with certain conditions. For more, see Q&A: Geneva II 
Peace Conference, BBC (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
middle-east-24628442. The international peace conference called for in Reso-
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help displaced Syrians has been limited to humanitarian assis-
tance.26 Indeed, attempts by international organizations and 
U.N. agencies to render humanitarian assistance adequate to 
meet the needs of displaced populations have continued to 
hinge crucially on the cooperation of Syrian authorities.27 The 
Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”), 
for instance, was able to provide only limited assistance to 
IDPs in Syria during 2012 and 2013, with access to crucial are-
as of the country restricted by the Syrian government.28 Out-
side states have also been reluctant to intervene.29 Due to all of 
                                                                                                             
lution 2118 to implement the Communique has become known as “Geneva II” 
and has faced delay due to noncooperation regarding which parties will at-
tend. Assad’s regime had not confirmed attendance at the time of writing. Id. 
However on November 11, 2013, the Opposition voted to  
attend peace talks . . . in Geneva if certain conditions were met, in-
cluding full access for delivery of humanitarian aid and the release of 
prisoners. . . . Few say they believe that the Geneva talks will yield a 
solution, yet those talks remain the focus of international diplomacy 
. . . The United States and Russia had hoped to hold talks by year’s 
end, but no date has been set.  
Anne Barnard & Hwaida Saad, Leading Syrian Opposition Group, Yielding to 
Pressure, Votes to Join Peace Talks, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/12/world/middleeast/syria.html. 
 26. Pursuant to the U.N. Charter (“Charter”), only the Security Council is 
authorized to use force or seek political solutions. Article 42 of the Charter 
authorizes the Council to “take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may 
be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.” U.N. 
Charter art. 42. As of early November 2013, the Security Council had not 
voted to make such an intervention. 
 27. Unless the sovereign state consents, generally, IDPs cannot receive 
assistance from international humanitarian organizations. Patrick Schmidt, 
The Process and Prospects for the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Dis-
placement to Become Customary International Law, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 483, 
489–90 (2004). 
 28. UNHCR Country Operations Profile—Syria, supra note 13. This aid is 
provided “within the framework of the UN Syria Humanitarian Response 
Plan and in collaboration with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent.” Id. In April 
2013, UNHCR reported having reached a “breaking point” due to lack of 
funds to provide assistance to the millions fleeing their homes in Syria. Syri-
an Refugee Crisis Worsens with Aid Efforts Grossly Underfunded, UN Warns, 
UN NEWS CTR. (Apr. 9, 2013), 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44602&Cr=syria&Cr1. 
 29. “The growing influence of radical Islamist fighters and divisions among 
rebel forces have made Western powers reluctant to intervene directly in a 
conflict that has killed more than 100,000 people and driven millions from 
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these complexities, the protection and assistance needs of Syri-
an IDPs have remained unmet.30 
The state’s inability or unwillingness to protect its displaced, 
and the inability or unwillingness of the international commu-
nity to sufficiently assist,31 is not unique to Syria among in-
stances of armed conflict.32 The dire displacement situation in 
Syria therefore presents an opportunity to consider the devel-
opment of international legal protections that could more effec-
tively assist those displaced due to internal armed conflict. Re-
cent activity of the African Union (“AU”), the leading regional 
organization on the African continent, offers an innovative ex-
ample of one such solution: framing the protection of and assis-
tance to IDPs as a regional responsibility. 
On December 6, 2012, the African Union Convention for the 
Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons (the 
“Kampala Convention” or the “Convention”) 33  entered into 
force.34 Upon ratification, the Kampala Convention became the 
                                                                                                             
their homes.” Yara Bayoumy, Arab League Backs Syria Peace Talks, Urges 
Opposition to Go, REUTERS (Nov. 4, 2013), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/04/us-syria-crisis-arabs-
idUSBRE9A30EQ20131104. 
 30. Syria: A Full-Scale Crisis, supra note 10. 
 31. As is the case with Syria, outside states are commonly hesitant to in-
tervene for humanitarian purposes due to complex “geopolitical concerns.” 
Roberta Cohen, The International Response to Darfur, FORCED MIGRATION 
REV. 23, 8 (2005) [hereinafter Cohen, International Response] (arguing that 
the nonintervention in Darfur is typical, as generally “wider interests stymie 
humanitarian intervention”). 
 32. Id. (establishing that the lack of governmental or outside assistance to 
IDPs in Darfur is not uncommon to the situation experienced by IDPs dis-
placed through armed conflict elsewhere). Indeed, IDPs commonly remain 
inadequately protected by their home state as well as by the international 
community. Id. (in the context of Darfur); see also Anne-Christine Eriksson, 
Protecting Internally Displaced Persons in Kosovo (Inter-Univ. Comm. on Int’l 
Migration, Rosemarie Rogers Working Paper Series No. 3, 1999), available at 
http://web.mit.edu/cis/www/migration/pubs/rrwp/3_protectIDPs.html (in the 
context of the Kosovo displacement crisis). 
 33. African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Inter-
nally Displaced Persons in Africa [Kampala Convention], opened for signa-
ture Oct. 22, 2009 (entered into force Dec. 6, 2012), available at 
http://au.int/en/content/african-union-convention-protection-and-assistance-
internally-displaced-persons-africa. 
 34. The fifteenth state to ratify was Swaziland—joining Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Gambia, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Leso-
tho, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Zambia—to bring the Conven-
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world’s first legally-binding instrument35 to define the respon-
sibilities of states toward IDPs.36 The Convention establishes 
active involvement on the part of the AU and reflects a general 
conception of internal displacement as a regional problem re-
quiring the cooperation of myriad regional actors. The Conven-
tion in this way envisions a solution to the common situation of 
a state’s inability or unwillingness to independently meet the 
needs of its IDPs that calls on the involvement of neighboring 
states parties, local civil society organizations, and the AU it-
self.37 The AU has been widely hailed for this development.38 
This Note argues that the Kampala Convention could serve 
as a template for the League of Arab States (the “Arab League” 
or the “League”)39 to adopt a regional solution to internal dis-
                                                                                                             
tion into force pursuant to the procedures established in the Convention. See 
Africa Takes the Lead! World’s First Continental Treaty to Protect Those 
Forced to Flee Comes into Force, INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CTR. 
(Dec. 6, 2012), http://www.internal-
displace-
ment.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/E20670B6C7BFA0E7C1257AC
B0062F15B/$file/kc-press-release-en.pdf [hereinafter Africa Takes the Lead]; 
Kampala Convention, INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CTR., 
http://www.internal-displacement.org/kampala-convention [hereinafter Kam-
pala Convention, IDMC]; Kampala Convention, supra note 33, art. 17(1). 
 35. In 2008, the General Assembly of the Organization of American States 
passed a resolution encouraging states to enhance protection efforts for IDPs. 
While this is a development deserving of accolades, it is important to note in 
this context that the language of the resolution is normative. The Assembly 
“urge[d] member states to consider using the Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement, prepared by the Special Representative of the United Nations 
Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, as a basis for their plans, 
policies, and programs in support of such persons.” Organization of American 
States [OAS], G.A. Res. 2417, OAS Doc. AG/RES. 2417 (XXXVIII-O/08) (June 
3, 2008). 
 36. Africa Takes the Lead, supra note 34. 
 37. Kampala Convention, supra note 33, art. 8. 
 38. See, e.g., Anna Taylor, Matthew Lopas & Sarone Solomon, Updates 
from the Regional Human Rights Systems, 19 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 47, 47–48 
(2011); Allehone Mulugeta Abebe, The African Union Convention on Internal-
ly Displaced Persons: Its Codification, Background, Scope, and Enforcement 
Challenges, REFUGEE SURVEY Q., Sept. 2010, at 28; Andrew Solomon, Intro-
ductory Note to African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of 
Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, 49 I.L.M. 83, 84 (2010). 
 39. The Arab League has been chosen for this example as it is considered 
the most prominent regional organization in the Arab region. See Marco Pin-
fari, Nothing but Failure?: The Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Coun-
cil as Mediators in Middle Eastern Conflicts, (Crisis States Research Ctr., 
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placement for instances in which reliance on national resources 
or international intervention leaves IDPs insufficiently pro-
tected or provided for, as is currently the situation in Syria.40 It 
is argued that the Arab League should employ a similar ap-
proach to that taken by the AU and create a convention that 
frames internal displacement as a regional problem with a re-
gional solution. Such an approach may prevent future large-
scale displacement crises and, absent prevention, better protect 
and assist those who do become displaced. 
Part I of this Note provides background on the current legal 
framework applicable to IDPs and examines the implications of 
a regional solution to the problem of internal displacement. 
Part II explores the regional conditions, provisions, and limita-
tions of the Kampala Convention. Part III considers transfer-
ring the AU’s approach to the Arab region through implemen-
                                                                                                             
Working Paper No. 45, 2009), available at 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/downloa
d/wp/wpSeries2/WP452.pdf. 
 40. Syria is one of twenty-two Arab League member states and has since 
November 2011 been temporarily suspended from the League:  
Syria has been suspended from the Arab League over its failure to 
end the bloodshed caused by brutal government crackdowns on pro-
democracy protests in a move that will increase the international 
pressure on President Bashar al-Assad. At an emergency session of 
its 22 member states in Cairo to discuss the crisis, the league decid-
ed to exclude Syria until it implements the terms of an earlier 
agreed peace deal to stop the violence. The league also agreed to im-
pose economic and political sanctions on Syria over its failure to stop 
the violence.   
The decision was made with the support of eighteen of the twenty-one other 
Arab League member states. David Batty & Jack Shenker, Syria Suspended 
from Arab League, GUARDIAN (Nov. 12, 2011), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/12/syria-suspended-arab-league. 
However, it is understood that the action taken against Syria “does not 
amount to a full suspension of membership from the regional body.” Arab 
League Decides to Suspend Syria, AL JAZEERA (Nov. 13, 2011), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/11/201111121342948333.ht
ml. Indeed, the Arab League has continued to take an active role in trying to 
negotiate an end to the conflict. “Arab League foreign ministers gathered in 
Cairo on Sunday to push the Syrian opposition to attend the proposed Gene-
va II peace conference.” Report: Arab League to Press Syria Opposition Over 
Peace Talks, RELIEFWEB (Nov. 3, 2013), http://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-
arab-republic/arab-league-press-syria-opposition-over-peace-talks; see, e.g., 
Bayoumy, supra note 29. 
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tation of a similar convention by the Arab League. The Note 
concludes with the suggestion that a convention that addresses 
internal displacement in the Arab region by framing it as a re-
gional issue, deserving of a regional solution, would well serve 
the Arab League as a viable alternative to the current options 
for providing protection and assistance to the region’s IDPs. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Legal Framework for Protection of IDPs 
The absence of an international legal framework applicable to 
IDPs reveals the unique and relatively invisible position in 
which internally displaced persons exist. Although IDPs and 
refugees often face similar factual conditions and require simi-
lar kinds of assistance, the two groups are classified separately 
under international law, legally distinct by virtue of their dif-
fering relationships with their states of nationality or habitual 
residence.41 
The transboundary nature of the situation of refugees impos-
es a responsibility on the international community to meet ref-
ugees’ needs.42 A refugee is a person who is, inter alia, dis-
placed “outside the country of his nationality.”43  The act of 
crossing the border takes that person out of the sovereignty of 
his home state and implicates international law.44 In contrast, 
IDPs are, by definition, displaced within the borders of their 
home state.45 As such, under traditional notions of sovereignty, 
                                                                                                             
 41. See, e.g., Won Kidane, Managing Forced Displacement by Law in Afri-
ca: The Role of the New African Union IDPs Convention, 44 VAND. 
J.TRANSNT’L L. 1 (2011). 
 42. See generally Brian Barbour & Brian Gorlick, Embracing the Respon-
sibility to Protect: A Repertoire of Measures Including Asylum for Potential 
Victims, 20 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 533 (2008). 
 43. The U.N. defines a refugee as:  
any person who . . . owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted 
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nation-
ality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail him-
self of the protection of that country. 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1(A)(2), opened for signa-
ture July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]. 
 44. See generally Barbour & Gorlick, supra note 42. 
 45. See GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT, supra note 1. 
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the home state retains primary responsibility for IDPs needs.46 
Very often, however, conditions within the home state have 
caused the displacement, so the home state is unable or unwill-
ing to meet those needs.47 Nonetheless, because IDPs remain 
within their state, they do not become the concern of interna-
tional law as do refugees.48 
While this legal difference does not prohibit international 
humanitarian organizations from assisting IDPs, it does limit 
the extent to which these organizations can help.49 The dearth 
of protection afforded IDPs led former U.N. Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan to call internal displacement “the great tragedy of 
our times,” and IDPs “among the most vulnerable of the human 
family.”50 
In the early 1990s, as internal displacement became more 
widespread, the U.N. authorized the U.N. Special Representa-
tive of the Secretary-General on IDPs to establish an “appro-
priate normative framework” that would state the current 
norms and rights of IDPs and obligations of states toward 
them.51 This framework became the Guiding Principles on In-
ternal Displacement (“Guiding Principles”) and articulated for 
                                                                                                             
 46. Flavia Giustiniani, New Hopes and Challenges for the Protection of 
IDPs in Africa: The Kampala Convention, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 347, 
348 (2011). 
 47. Kidane, supra note 41, at 45. 
 48. Elizabeth E. Ruddick, The Continuing Constraint of Sovereignty: In-
ternational Law, International Protection, and the Internally Displaced, 77 
B.U. L. REV. 429, 440, 452 (1997). 
 49. For example, UNHCR was mandated by the U.N. General Assembly in 
1950 to provide protection and assistance to refugees when host governments 
cannot sufficiently do so. Internally displaced persons were not included in 
the mandate. Refugee Convention, supra note 43. Since 1972, UNHCR has 
been extended authority by the General Assembly to assist IDPs on an ad hoc 
basis when the country requires assistance. Roberta Cohen, Humanitarian 
Imperatives Are Transforming Sovereignty, 16 ILSA Q. 14, 15 (2008) [herein-
after Cohen, Humanitarian Imperatives]. This practical implication of the 
distinct legal status for IDPs is rooted in “deference to traditional notions of 
sovereignty.” Id. 
 50. Jan Egeland, foreword to GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INTERNAL 
DISPLACEMENT, supra note 1. 
 51. Representative of the Secretary-General, Internally Displaced Persons: 
Rep. of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, 
Submitted Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1997/39, ¶ 
2, Comm’n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53 (Feb. 11, 1998) (by 
Francis M. Deng). 
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the first time rights of states toward IDPs.52 The Guiding Prin-
ciples are recognized as a significant step in the evolution of a 
doctrine of international protection for IDPs and they remain 
the most important articulation of this protection on an inter-
national scale.53  In 2005, the U.N. World Summit Outcome 
document endorsed the Guiding Principles54 and expressed “re-
solve to take effective measures to increase the protection of 
internally displaced persons.” 55  However, neither the World 
Summit Outcome document nor the Guiding Principles are 
binding on member states.56 
As such, while refugees have been accorded international 
protection for over sixty years,57 IDPs continue to occupy a la-
cuna of legal protection. No similar binding international 
framework articulating standards for the protection and assis-
tance of IDPs yet exists58 despite the increased visibility of the 
plight of IDPs during the past decade. Indeed, amid this ongo-
ing chasm of legal protection, the last decade has seen more 
people displaced than ever before.59 The world now has almost 
twice as many IDPs as refugees.60 For example, by summer 
2013, the number of displaced persons within Syria was rough-
                                                                                                             
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 
(Sept. 16, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 World Summit Outcome]. For more on this, 
see ALEX J. BELLAMY, RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: THE GLOBAL EFFORT TO END 
MASS ATROCITIES 133 (2009). 
 55. 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 54, ¶ 132. This wording was 
confirmed in a General Assembly resolution. G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/60/168 (Mar. 7, 2006). See also Cohen, Humanitarian Imperatives, 
supra note 49, at 18 (referring to the World Summit Outcome, supra note 54). 
 56. Like all U.N. General Assembly resolutions, the World Summit Out-
come is not a legally binding document, but “is more appropriately considered 
a political commitment.” Saira Mohamed, Taking Stock of the Responsibility 
to Protect, 48 STAN. J. INT’L L. 319, 328–29 & n.57 (2012); Giustiniani, supra 
note 46, at 349. 
 57. Since 1951, the U.N. has recognized refugees as a special legal catego-
ry possessing certain rights and owed certain obligations by the international 
community. Refugee Convention, supra note 43. 
 58. Barbour & Gorlick, supra note 42, at 555. 
 59. See Global Overview 2011: People Internally Displaced by Armed Con-
flict and Violence, INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CTR. (Apr. 2012), 
http://www.internal-displacement.org/publications/global-overview-2011 
[hereinafter Global Overview]; see also Cohen, Humanitarian Imperatives, 
supra note 49. 
 60. Schmidt, supra note 27, at 485. 
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ly four times the number of Syrians who fled the country as 
refugees.61 The growth in the number of IDPs emphasizes that 
the consideration of where the legal responsibility for this pop-
ulation falls requires serious attention and should be priori-
tized. 
B. The Role of Regional Organizations 
One forum suited to address legal responsibility for IDPs is 
regional organizations. Regional organizations have long 
served an important role in the international community.62 The 
U.N. Charter (the “Charter”) encourages an active role for re-
gional organizations, contemplating a relationship of support 
and coexistence between regional organizations and the inter-
national U.N. system.63 The Charter does not define regional 
organizations, but the term as used is generally interpreted 
broadly to “focus appropriately on function rather than form.”64 
One scholar has made this term more tangible, offering an in-
terpretation of the regional arrangements contemplated by the 
Charter as “less-than-global, state-based entities or associa-
tions that need not be treaty-based and that may include geo-
graphically, politically, or economically oriented organiza-
tions.”65 The U.N. Secretary-General recently called attention 
to the primacy of the role the Charter envisioned for regional 
organizations, noting that “[t]he architects of the United Na-
                                                                                                             
 61. While at least two million Syrians were estimated to be internally dis-
placed by January 2013, 600,000 Syrians had fled Syria into neighboring 
countries by the same date. Anne Barnard, Dozens of Civilians Are Said to Be 
Killed by Syrian Airstrikes, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/15/world/middleeast/syria-launches-deadly-
airstrikes-in-damascus-suburbs.html. 
 62. U.N. Secretary-General, The Role of Regional and Sub-Regional Ar-
rangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the Secre-
tary-General, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/65/877-S/2011/393 (June 27, 2011) [hereinafter 
Secretary-General’s Report on R2P]. 
 63. Article 52 of the U.N. Charter encourages “the existence of regional 
arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the 
maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for re-
gional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activi-
ties are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.” 
U.N. Charter art. 52. 
 64. James Hickey, Challenges to Security Council Monopoly Power over the 
Use of Force in Enforcement Actions: The Case of Regional Organizations, 10 
INT’L LEGAL THEORY 69, 78 (2004). 
 65. Id. 
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tions accorded a prominent place to regional arrangements in 
their vision of the new world body.”66 He emphasized that this 
original conception of regional organizations envisioned in the 
Charter has been realized, with these organizations playing an 
increasingly significant role in the world order.67 
In addition to highlighting the importance of regional organi-
zations generally, in recent years the U.N. has specifically rec-
ognized regional organizations as well-positioned to provide an 
alternative to action by the Security Council or U.N. General 
Assembly.68 The Secretary-General also emphasized specifical-
ly that the Charter “underline[s] the value of ongoing working 
relationships among global, regional and sub-regional organi-
zations for prevention and protection purposes.”69 Indeed, in 
the early twenty-first century, the U.N. has explicitly noted the 
crucial role regional organizations play in the maintenance of 
international peace and security.70 With numerous controver-
sial examples of instances in which the Security Council did or 
did not resolve to intervene “in time” to adequately protect a 
population,71 an approach that would not require the same po-
litical and diplomatic considerations as those faced by the Se-
curity Council is attractive.72 A regional approach could thus 
                                                                                                             
 66. Secretary-General’s Report on R2P, supra note 62, ¶ 2. 
 67. Id. ¶ 2. 
 68. Id. ¶ 2. 
 69. Id. ¶ 5. 
 70. As one example, member states at the 2005 World Outcome Summit 
“[r]ecogniz[ed] the important contribution to peace and security by regional 
organizations.” 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 54, ¶ 93. The Secre-
tary-General has since emphasized this recognition given in the World Sum-
mit Outcome. Secretary-General’s Report on R2P, supra note 62, ¶ 3. 
 71. For discussion of examples, see, e.g., Wed Nanda, The Future under 
International Law of the Responsibility to Protect after Libya and Syria, 21 
MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 1 (2013); Alison Des Forges & Timothy Longman, Legal 
Responses to Genocide in Rwanda, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND 
THE COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY 49–68 (Eric Stover & 
Harvey M. Weinstein eds., 2004) (discussing the inaction of the international 
community and the OAU during the genocide in Rwanda in 1994); Simon 
Chesterman, “Leading from Behind”: The Responsibility to Protect, the 
Obama Doctrine, and Humanitarian Intervention after Libya, 25 ETHICS & 
INT’L AFF. 279, 279–85 (2011). 
 72. This aligns with the statement of member states in the 2005 World 
Summit Outcome document: 
The international community, through the United Nations, also has 
the responsibility to . . . help protect populations from genocide, war 
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serve as an alternative to reliance on the Security Council to 
act to maintain or restore international peace and security. The 
high-level recognition of this both suggests and contributes to 
the increasingly visible, active position that regional organiza-
tions are seen to play in preventing conflict and protecting 
populations in the contemporary world.73 
This is in line with a regionalist approach. Scholars advocat-
ing for regionalism, who take the view that regions are “signifi-
cant in their own right, and not merely derivative of state pow-
er or global processes,”74 have presented and defended the posi-
tion that regional institutions are singularly positioned to bring 
about certain change that no other institution or actor could.75 
These scholars suggest that regional institutions can be im-
portant and powerful forces for social and political change due 
to the unique character of regions as both local and interna-
tional.76 
An illustrative example of regional organizations’ capacity to 
spearhead solutions to contemporary problems is provided by 
the leadership role that regional organizations are taking in 
creating disaster response policy and addressing issues arising 
                                                                                                             
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this con-
text, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and deci-
sive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the 
Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in coop-
eration with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should 
peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly 
fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the 
General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to 
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the 
principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to 
commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States 
build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assist-
ing those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break 
out.  
2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 54, ¶139. 
 73. Cilja Harders & Matteo Legrenzi, Introduction to BEYOND 
REGIONALISM: REGIONAL COOPERATION, REGIONALISM AND REGIONALIZATION IN 
THE MIDDLE EAST 1 (Cilja Harders & Matteo Legrenzi eds., 2008). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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from migration due to climate change.77 Natural disasters and 
climate change are two conspicuous examples that highlight 
the fact that states in a particular region are often faced con-
currently with “similar environmental phenomena and haz-
ards.” 78  Regional organizations therefore may be best posi-
tioned to lead discussions on appropriate, vernacular solutions 
tailored to these vernacular problems, which will best serve the 
region, its states, and its populations.79 For the same reasons, a 
regional organization would be well situated to address inter-
nal displacement, whether due to change in the political or 
natural climate. As is poignantly demonstrated by the wide-
spread displacement caused by conflict arising out of the Arab 
Spring uprisings, the same factors may be the force for change 
in many states throughout a region, making a regional organi-
                                                                                                             
 77.  
One particular area where regional organizations seem to be playing 
a leading role is in the relationship between migration and climate 
change. Regional processes to deal with labor migration have been 
increasing in importance over the past decade or so . . . [Likewise, 
w]ith growing recognition of the potential effects of climate change, 
regional organizations are becoming aware that they have particular 
roles to play in policy discussions. Regions are more likely to face 
similar environmental phenomena and hazards and if (or when) 
people are forced to leave their countries because of the effects of 
climate change, they are likely to turn first to nearby countries. 
Elizabeth Ferris & Daniel Petz, In the Neighborhood: The Growing Role of 
Regional Organizations in Disaster Risk Management, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 
2013), http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2013/02/regional-
organizations-disaster-risk-ferris, at 3. Authors Ferris and Petz conclude 
their study by arguing that their 
research has shown that in almost all regions of the world, regional 
organizations are playing increasingly active roles in disaster risk 
management. While each region has unique characteristics that 
shape the nature and activities of its regional bodies, it seems as if 
they all (or almost all) see value in working together to prevent dis-
asters and to a lesser extent to respond to disasters occurring in the 
region. 
Id. at 25. 
 78. Id. at 3. 
 79. Ferris & Petz, supra note 77, at 1–4. See also KATHERINE HAVER & 
CONOR FOLEY, INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE ON STRENGTHENING PARTNERSHIP IN 
DISASTER RESPONSE: BACKGROUND PAPER 2 (Oct. 2011), available at 
http://www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/93533/Background%20paper%202.pdf. 
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zation a fitting venue for crafting well-tailored solutions. While 
these conflicts may be contained within a state, they affect the 
region as a whole.80 
Regional approaches to regional phenomena also bring im-
portant indirect benefits. One theory holds that “functional re-
gional cooperation on specific issues can contribute to peace 
and security, . . . [as] cooperation between countries on specific 
practical issues can lead to cooperation on broader issues, lead-
ing to decreasing likelihood of conflict between the countries 
and eventually to the development of regional identities.” 81 
This would seem an especially valuable consequence for re-
gional organizations plagued by disharmony. 82  Harnessing 
such cooperation will be of increasing import in the contempo-
rary era in which the value of regional institutions is garnering 
much attention.83 
It may be possible to counter the advocacy of a regional ap-
proach to internal displacement with the Responsibility to Pro-
tect or “R2P” doctrine.84 While there was much discussion in 
the early twenty-first century of an emerging customary norm 
recognizing the international community’s “responsibility to 
protect” the citizens of a state when the state has failed to do 
so, the doctrine has not been utilized consistently or successful-
ly.85 It remains an issue of debate whether an international re-
sponsibility to step in would be beneficial to the international 
community,86 but it is clear that a reliable R2P framework has 
                                                                                                             
 80. In early October, the Security Council “voiced ‘deep concern’ at the 
consequences of the refugee crisis caused by the conflict, ‘which has a destabi-
lizing impact on the entire region.’” U.N. Security Council Urges All Sides, 
supra note 22. 
 81. This is called a functionalist approach. See, e.g., Ferris & Petz, supra 
note 77, at 2; see also Louise Fawcett, Exploring Regional Domains: A Com-
parative History of Regionalism, 80 INT’L AFF. 429, 431 (2004). 
 82. See infra Parts III.A and III.B.2 for more on the Arab League’s reputa-
tion for weak leadership amid intra-regional noncooperation. 
 83. See Amitav Acharya & Alastair Iain Johnston, Comparing Regional 
Institutions: An Introduction, in CRAFTING COOPERATION: REGIONAL 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1–31 (Amitav 
Acharya & Alastair Iain Johnston eds., 2007). 
 84. For background on R2P, see generally, Barbour & Gorlick, supra note 
42. 
 85. See Cohen, International Response, supra note 31, at 7. 
 86. Scholars have argued that “a well-defined, coordinated response where 
states and the international community of actors including the U.N., regional 
and sub-regional actors and civil society take responsibility according to an 
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yet to crystallize.87 The applicability of the doctrine to situa-
tions of internal displacement also remains unclear.88 The R2P 
doctrine thus requires further elucidation and clarification of 
existing misconceptions about its use before it is considered as 
a viable option to assist IDPs.89 
With no indication that the R2P doctrine will solidify in the 
near future,90 an additional benefit of a regional approach to 
IDP protection may be to punt the thorny question of whether 
and to what degree a responsibility on the part of the interna-
tional community as a whole to care for a sovereign state’s na-
tionals exists. A regional response provides an alternative; with 
responsibility for IDPs rendered an intraregional duty, the con-
troversial and nebulous R2P issue may be sidestepped alto-
gether.91 
II. THE AU’S APPROACH TO INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT: AN 
EMPHASIS ON REGIONAL COOPERATION 
A. The Kampala Convention: Context, Characterizing Condi-
tions, and Limitations 
An examination of the background, objectives, and key provi-
sions of the Convention sheds light on the conditions that gave 
rise to an atmosphere ripe for its creation and illustrates what 
aspects of this approach could be utilized for successful transfer 
beyond the AU. 
1. The Context: Africa and the African Union 
As the Kampala Convention necessarily reflects values of the 
AU, exploring the context of the AU’s history and character is 
                                                                                                             
established R2P framework” is necessary to meet the shortcomings of state 
response to humanitarian disasters in the twenty-first century world order. 
Barbour & Gorlick, supra note 42, at 560. 
 87. See Edward C. Luck, The Responsible Sovereign and the Responsibility 
to Protect, in 1 ANNUAL REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS AFFAIRS 1-xxxiii to 1-x1ii 
(Joachim W. Müller & Karl P. Sauvant eds., 2006–2007). 
 88. See, e.g., Cohen, International Response, supra note 31, at 7. 
 89. Barbour & Gorlick, supra note 42, at 555. 
 90. See Nanda, supra note 71. The effectiveness of an R2P framework is 
also hindered by logistics, with no “international enforcement machinery” in 
place to offer protection or assistance to IDPs. Cohen, International Response, 
supra note 31, at 8. 
 91. Barbour & Gorlick, supra note 42. 
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an essential starting place to further an understanding of the 
foundations for this instrument. The AU was established in 
2001 as the successor to the Organization of African Unity 
(“OAU”),92 amid recognition by OAU member states of a need 
for a regional organization better suited to serve the goals of a 
developing, post-colonial continent.93 With the signing of the 
Constitutive Act, the AU became Africa’s premier intergovern-
mental organization, with fifty-four state parties as of Novem-
ber 2013.94 
The moment in which the AU was established shaped its ob-
jectives as reflected in the structure and substance of the Con-
stitutive Act, which in turn informed the Kampala Convention. 
The AU was conceived of in the immediate post-Cold War 
years, during which time regional organizations shifted with 
the changing global order in the aftermath of several signifi-
cant regional crises.95 
Regional organizations formed during the Cold War were 
predominantly established to protect the member states from 
“external threats,” with the principal of sovereignty reigning 
supreme.96 Regional organizations established during the mid- 
and late-twentieth century accordingly prioritized “collective 
defense” over all other considerations.97 After the Cold War, 
however, this focus changed dramatically amid new recognition 
of intraregional threats98 and a related emphasis on the re-
                                                                                                             
 92. “Established in 1963, the OAU had as its main goal the elimination of 
colonization in Africa and the promotion of unity and solidarity among Afri-
can states for the betterment of its peoples.” Stacy-Ann Elvy, Theories of 
State Compliance with International Law: Assessing the African Union’s Abil-
ity to Ensure State Compliance with the African Charter and the Constitutive 
Act, 41 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 75, 82 (2012). 
 93. The Organization of African Unity, DEP’T OF INT’L RELATIONS & 
COOPERATION, http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/africa/oau.htm (last 
visited Jan. 19, 2013) (S. Afr.). 
 94. Morocco is the only African nation that is not an active member of the 
AU. AU in a Nutshell, AFR. UNION, http://www.au.int/en/about/nutshell (last 
visited Nov. 14, 2013). 
 95. These crises include those in Rwanda, Yugoslavia, and Kosovo during 
the 1990s. See Cohen, Humanitarian Imperatives, supra note 49, at 14; see 
also Davis Brown, The Role of Regional Organizations in Stopping Civil 
Wars, 41 A.F. L. Rev. 255, 250 (1997). 
 96. Brown, supra note 95, at 251. 
 97. Id. at 241–42. 
 98. Id. at 250. 
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sponsibility of sovereign states toward each other.99 While the 
principle of nonintervention by a member state in the internal 
affairs of another had been a central tenet on which regional 
organizations had formerly been based,100 following the Cold 
War “regional and global security perspectives” radically shift-
ed toward a focus on preserving and fostering the relationships 
between the states in a region.101 
The AU was created during this shift, and the Constitutive 
Act indeed reflects an emphasis on strengthening intraregional 
responsibility.102 Whereas the OAU was primarily concerned 
with securing independent identities for the former colonies, 
the Constitutive Act evidences an attempt on the part of the 
AU to limit sovereignty “by defining sovereignty in terms of a 
state’s willingness and capacity to provide protection to its na-
tionals.”103 Reconceptualizing the role of the regional organiza-
tion in this way allowed the AU to address and seek to “im-
prove the normative framework for protecting and assisting 
displaced persons . . . [and] strengthen [the] institutions” in-
volved.104 
Indeed, particular provisions of the Constitutive Act reveal 
the notion that regional solutions to internal problems were 
deemed well within the AU’s scope of concern. Most significant-
ly, Article 4(h) codifies “the right of the Union to intervene in a 
Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in re-
spect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and 
crimes against humanity.”105 Questions surround the scope and 
definition of this intervention power,106 as neither the Constitu-
                                                                                                             
 99. See Cohen, Humanitarian Imperatives, supra note 49. 
 100. Brown, supra note 95, at 237. 
 101. Id. at 251. 
 102. “Regional organizations now no longer needed for collective defense 
have begun to assert a new role in collective security by stopping civil wars 
and helping (or making) combatants achieve peace,” thus “the role of regional 
organizations in preventing or stopping internal conflicts has expanded.” Id. 
at 236–37. 
 103. Dyani-Mhango Ntombizozuko, Reflections on the African Union’s Right 
to Intervene, 38 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 1, 11 (2012). 
 104. Abebe, supra note 38. 
 105. Constitutive Act, AFR. UNION art. 4(h) (July 11, 2000), available at 
http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/aboutau/constitutive_act_en.htm. 
 106. Some scholars have argued that the AU’s “right” of intervention is 
more properly interpreted to be a duty:  
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tive Act nor subsequent treaties or documents define the sub-
stance of the right or the procedure to follow when invoking 
it.107 Further, there has not yet been an occasion for the judicial 
organ of the AU to interpret the scope of the intervention pow-
er.108 
At the time of writing, the AU had not exercised its Article 
4(h) power to intervene in a member state without that state’s 
                                                                                                             
[A] “right” implies that the AU does not have to intervene when cir-
cumstances that pertain to crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
and genocide occur. A legal duty, on the other hand, may create legal 
consequences for the AU if it fails to execute its obligation to inter-
vene as compared to a discretionary “right to intervene.” 
Ntombizozuko, supra note 103, at 12–13 (citing Nsongurua Udombana, When 
Neutrality Is a Sin: The Darfur Crisis and the Crisis of a Humanitarian In-
tervention in Sudan, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 1149, 1157 n.42 (2005)). 
 107. Ntombizozuko provided an overview of the issues related to interpret-
ing the intervention power: 
It is unclear whether the AU Assembly may first conduct an investi-
gation before determining if an intervention is necessary, or whether 
it needs to first decide to intervene before finding out if indeed inter-
national crimes were committed in a member state. Article 4(h) re-
quires that there must be a commission of an international crime to 
necessitate an intervention . . . There is no institution operational 
yet to interpret Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act or the AU Assem-
bly’s decision to intervene or not to intervene. The African Court of 
Justice [the AU institution with subject matter jurisdiction over the 
interpretation and application of the Constitutive Act; any question 
of international law; all acts, decisions, regulations, and directives of 
AU organs; and circumstances that would constitute a breach of an 
obligation owed to a state party or the AU] is not yet operational . . . 
[but] will be helpful in interpreting Article 4(h) to ascertain the 
meaning of intervention . . . The Constitutive Act provides that if 
the  organ responsible for its interpretation is not operational, the 
AU Assembly can assume such function as long as the decision 
reaches a two-thirds majority. This may be problematic, especially 
when it comes to deciding on the meaning of the right to intervene, 
as the AU Assembly may be embroiled in disagreements . . . There 
has not been an instance where the meaning of the AU’s right to in-
tervention has been questioned in practical terms. One hopes that 
when that time comes the African Court of Justice will be fully oper-
ational. 
Ntombizozuko, supra note 103, at 14–17. 
 108. The African Court of Justice would have jurisdiction over this question 
of jurisdiction, but is not yet fully operational. See id. at 15–17. 
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consent.109 Scholars posit that this is due to logistical and ideo-
logical hindrances; logistical, as the AU Assembly normally 
meets only twice a year and assembly decisions require at least 
a two-thirds majority vote of all members,110 and ideological, 
“given the continent’s traditional reluctance to endorse inter-
ventionism.”111 As such, the use of the Article 4(h) authority 
would be both “time-consuming and fraught with political ob-
stacles.”112 By this understanding, intervention pursuant to Ar-
ticle 4(h) “may not happen at all or may happen too late.”113 
Other scholars have suggested that the provision’s lack of use 
indicates that the AU remains uncomfortable with circumvent-
ing state sovereignty, and that it remains unclear whether the 
“AU Assembly has, in fact, changed its stance of non-
intervention in internal armed conflicts.”114 However, the exist-
ence of this provision suggests that the drafters at least desired 
intraregional responsibility to coexist with sovereignty, to allow 
for the possibility115 of intervention when deemed necessary.116 
2. Key Provisions of the Kampala Convention 
From early in the organization’s existence, there was com-
mitment on the part of the AU to work to relieve the situation 
of Africa’s displaced.117 The Kampala Convention accordingly 
reflects the AU’s foundational principles. The Convention fun-
damentally “reaffirm[s] the principle of the respect for sover-
                                                                                                             
 109. Id. at 43–44. However the AU has exercised its right to intervene 
through the consent of the member state involved (pursuant to Article 4(j)) on 
at least three occasions: “in Burundi to build peace, intervened in Darfur to 
enable the establishment of a more robust U.N. peace operation and to moni-
tor the humanitarian crisis effectively, and intervened in Somalia to coordi-
nate efforts to advance the cause of peace.” Id. at 33. 
 110. Constitutive Act, supra note 105, art. 7(1). 
 111. Bellamy, supra note 54, at 78–79, quoted in Ntombizozuko, supra note 
103, at 44. 
 112. Bellamy, supra note 54, at 78–79, quoted in Ntombizozuko, supra note 
103, at 44. 
 113. Ntombizozuko, supra note 103, at 44. 
 114. Id. 
 115. For more on the discussion of whether the authority to intervene is 
more properly considered a right or a duty, see supra note 106. 
 116. Solomon, supra note 38. 
 117. Chaloka Beyani, Recent Developments: The Elaboration of a Legal 
Framework for the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, 50 J. 
AFR. L. 187, 189–90 (2006). 
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eign equality” among member states,118 and makes clear that 
nothing within it is intended to supersede the notion that 
states retain primary responsibility for the persons within 
their borders. 119  However, the Convention’s substance and 
structure also suggest that the AU recognized the benefits for 
regional accountability that exists prominently alongside this 
emphasis on sovereign equality. As indicated by the first objec-
tive “to promote and strengthen regional and national 
measures” 120  for preventing displacement and assisting and 
protecting IDPs, the AU sought to introduce this notion on re-
gional cooperation as a buttress to national action.121 
The Convention strikes this balance by framing states par-
ties’ substantive obligations not as individual duties the state 
owes only to its IDPs, but as responsibilities that states owe as 
part of a network of regional actors.122 For instance, states par-
ties are obligated to extend adequate humanitarian assistance 
where appropriate to communities in need,123 and when unable 
to provide sufficient support to their own IDPs, states parties 
are obligated to request assistance from relevant regional ac-
tors.124 They are required to cooperate with those actors who 
subsequently render assistance.125 In this they must “allow rap-
id and unimpeded passage of all relief consignments, equip-
ment and personnel” to the internally displaced; sovereignty is 
given no place in that arrangement.126 States parties are fur-
ther required to provide resources to assist and protect other 
states’ IDPs when assistance is requested by that other state or 
by the Conference of States Parties,127 as well as to protect 
IDPs regardless of the cause of displacement.128 Upon ratifica-
                                                                                                             
 118. Kampala Convention, supra note 33, pmbl. 
 119. Id. art. 5(1), (12), art. 7(2). 
 120. Id. art. 2(a). 
 121. See Giustiniani, supra note 46. 
 122. For instance, states parties must “ensure assistance to internally dis-
placed persons by meeting their basic needs as well as allowing and facilitat-
ing rapid and unimpeded access by humanitarian organizers and personnel.” 
Kampala Convention, supra note 33, art. 3(1)(j). 
 123. Id. art. 9(2)(b). 
 124. Id. art. 5(6). 
 125. Id. art. 5(6). 
 126. Id. art. 5(7). 
 127. Id. arts. 6(1), (2). 
 128. Kampala Convention, supra note 33, art. 9(1)(a). One can imagine a 
regional twist to this obligation; for instance, it would require a state to ren-
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tion, states parties are required to implement the obligations 
into domestic laws and policies,129 including incorporating the 
Convention’s substantive obligations into relevant legislation130 
as well as creating “an authority or body” that will be “respon-
sible for . . . cooperating with relevant international organiza-
tions or agencies, and civil society organizations, where no such 
authority or body exists.”131 
The Convention also codifies the obligations of a wide range 
of other regional actors. One objective of the Convention is to 
“provide for the respective obligations, responsibilities, and 
roles of armed groups, non-state actors and other relevant ac-
tors, including civil society organizations, with respect to the 
prevention of internal displacement and the protection of, and 
assistance to, internally displaced persons.”132 
Additionally, the Kampala Convention specifically articulates 
the role and obligations of the AU vis-à-vis internal displace-
ment in Africa.133 First, the Convention incorporates the Con-
stitutive Act’s intervention power, and gives the AU a right to 
intervene either upon request of two-thirds of the AU Assembly 
in situations deemed “grave circumstances,”134 or upon unilat-
eral request by a state party “to restore peace and security.”135 
The AU is also obligated to provide necessary support to states 
parties in the prevention of displacement and in the protection 
of IDPs in the form of coordinating the mobilization of re-
sources and collaborating with international organizations, 
states parties, civil society organizations (“CSOs”), and human-
itarian organizations.136 
                                                                                                             
der protection to IDPs uprooted in its territory due to conflict in a neighbor-
ing state. 
 129. Id. art. 3(2). 
 130. Id. art. 3(2)(a). 
 131. Id. art. 3(2)(b). 
 132. Id. art. 2(1)(e). For instance, Article 6 establishes the obligations of 
international organizations and humanitarian agencies are established; Arti-
cle 7 addresses members of armed groups (who “shall be held criminally re-
sponsible for their acts which violate the rights of IDPs under international 
law and national law”); Article 10 addresses the duties of private stakehold-
ers causing displacement through development projects. See id. arts. 6, 7, 10. 
 133. Id. art. 8. 
 134. Id. art. 8(1). Grave circumstances are therein defined as war crimes, 
genocide, and crimes against humanity. Id. 
 135. Id. art. 8(2). 
 136. Kampala Convention, supra note 33, art. 8(3). 
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Through all of these provisions, the Convention communi-
cates the AU’s position that meeting the needs of IDPs involves 
a web of cooperating regional actors.137 The Convention articu-
lates duties that recognize a multi-layered support system of 
states, non-state actors, and the AU by which this understand-
ing is made manifest. In light of the increased reliance on and 
noted benefits of regional organizations,138 the AU has taken a 
logical and forward-looking approach to a problem that re-
mained unsolvable when traditionally considered to be a purely 
national responsibility. 
3. Limitations of the Convention 
However groundbreaking the Convention may be, the inevi-
table limitations of the Convention illustrate the downsides of 
a regionally cooperative approach to the protection and assis-
tance of IDPs. Noteworthy potential limitations are the hesi-
tancy of states to ratify, the questionable strength of the Con-
vention’s enforcement mechanism, and the effectiveness of the 
AU’s intervention power. 
The majority of signatories to the Convention had yet to rati-
fy the document at the time of publication, and over two-thirds 
of AU member states had neither signed nor ratified.139 Politi-
cal unpopularity at the state level and the large financial com-
mitments that accompany ratification are understood to be 
primary reasons for states’ reluctance to sign or ratify the Con-
vention.140 The political climate in many states is such that 
displacement is not prioritized on the national agenda.141 In 
other cases, the Convention has been seen as politically unpop-
ular due to the positive obligations it places upon ratifying 
states.142 Specifically, the obligation to bring national laws into 
compliance (which could be expensive or represent a major 
                                                                                                             
 137. For more on the drafting process of the Kampala Convention, see 
Giustiniani, supra note 46. 
 138. Ferris & Petz, supra note 77. 
 139. Twenty of the thirty-five AU member states that had signed the Con-
vention had not ratified it as of January 2013. Kampala Convention, IDMC, 
supra note 34. 
 140. See Giustiniani, supra note 46. 
 141. Taylor, Lopas & Soloman, supra note 38, at 48. 
 142. Id. 
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change in policy), 143  the obligation to prevent displacement 
from private development projects,144 and the obligation to pro-
vide reparations upon displacement145 all serve as obstacles to 
ratification. 
A second limitation is the concern that the Convention does 
not have the strong enforcement mechanisms necessary to en-
sure compliance with its guidelines.146 Scholars have comment-
ed that the Convention will hinge on compliance at the national 
level as well as on effective oversight by the AU.147 Yet, it has 
been argued that the Convention’s oversight system is weak, 
and that the AU will not be able to compel compliance.148 In-
deed, while the Convention has certain oversight functions in 
place, it is not clear what power the AU has to compel compli-
ance. 
For instance, the Convention obligates states parties to im-
plement measures at the national level “for monitoring and 
evaluating the effectiveness and impact of the humanitarian 
assistance delivered to IDPs,”149 and for the establishment of “a 
Conference of States Parties . . . to monitor and review the im-
                                                                                                             
 143. Many states parties of the Convention simply do not have the financial 
assets that ratification would require to bring national laws into compliance 
with the Convention’s obligations. Id. 
 144. Kampala Convention, supra note 33, art. 10. 
 145. Id. art. 12. 
 146. Lauren Groth, Engendering Protection: An Analysis of the 2009 Kam-
pala Convention and Its Provisions for Internally Displaced Women, 23 INT’L 
J. REFUGEE L. 221, 251 (2011); Giustiniani, supra note 46, at 370. A similar 
weakness in the Constitutive Act has also been highlighted; scholars have 
suggested that “the Constitutive Act should be revised to more effectively 
ensure state compliance” with its principles and the principles of the AU 
Charter. Elvy, supra note 92, at 88. 
 147. Abebe, supra note 38, at 52; Giustiniani, supra note 46, at 370; Ferris 
& Petz, supra note 77. 
 148. Giustiniani, supra note 46, at 370. It has also been noted that it may 
not be possible to force compliance by non-state actors who are not parties to 
the Convention but who are nonetheless the subject of obligations within it. 
These include international organizations and humanitarian agencies who 
are the subjects of Article 6, and members of armed groups who are the sub-
jects of Article 7. Analysis: African IDP Convention Fills a Void in Humani-
tarian Law, IRIN (Oct. 27, 2009), 
http://www.irinnews.org/report/86762/analysis-african-idp-convention-fills-a-
void-in-humanitarian-law. 
 149. Kampala Convention, supra note 33, art. 9(2)(m). This may be done 
pursuant to assistance by international organizations, humanitarian agen-
cies, CSOs, and other regional actors. Id. art. 9(3). 
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plementation of the objectives of the Convention,” 150  which 
would meet regularly pursuant to AU facilitation.151 This pro-
vision further obligates states to “enhance their capacity for 
cooperation and mutual support under the auspices of the Con-
ference of the States Parties.”152 This system is of obvious prac-
tical import; with no oversight function, states that ratify the 
Convention have no incentive to take the challenging and cost-
ly steps to implement the provisions into national laws. An 
oversight function ensures that there are repercussions for 
states that do not comply.153 Such provisions accordingly help 
to facilitate the Convention and to provide necessary support to 
encourage its implementation.154 It remains to be seen whether 
states will comply with their obligations post-ratification and, 
if not, whether the oversight system in place will effectively 
compel compliance. If these concerns are realized, the ability of 
the Convention to accomplish its goals would be jeopardized. 
Finally, the effect of the AU’s intervention power pursuant to 
Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act and incorporated into Arti-
cle 8 of the Kampala Convention has been questioned.155 What 
is clear is that there are specific limits to the intervention pow-
er: it may only be exercised in cases of crimes against humani-
ty, war crimes, and genocide,156 and any intervention would 
first depend on the AU being willing and able to facilitate the 
intervention.157 As noted above, the intervention power has yet 
                                                                                                             
 150. Id. art. 14(1). 
 151. Id. art. 14(3). 
 152. Id. art. 14(2). 
 153. As stated by the president of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, Jakob Kellenberger, “[t]he crucial challenge now is . . . ensuring that 
once the convention is signed and ratified by as many states as possible, it is 
actually implemented and respected. States must now take concrete steps to 
implement the convention into their own national legislation and regulation 
systems, and develop plans of action to address issues of displacement.” 
Analysis: African IDP Convention, supra note 148. 
 154. See Giustiniani, supra note 46. 
 155. Kampala Convention, supra note 33, art. 8. 
 156. But the Constitutive Act does not define these crimes. It seems the 
drafters intended the definitions of these international crimes to mirror the 
definitions already codified in statutes of the ICTY, ICTR, and the Rome 
Statute. Ntombizozuko, supra note 103, at 13–14 (restating an explanation 
by Tiyanjana Maluwa, AU’s counsel the drafting process, provided in Ti-
yanjana Maluwa, The OAU/African Union and International Law: Mapping 
New Boundaries or Revisiting Old Terrain?, 98 ASIL PROC. 232, 236 (2004)). 
 157. Ntombizozuko, supra note 103, 20–24. 
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to be exercised,158 and the right of intervention has not been 
defined in either the Constitutive Act or the Kampala Conven-
tion.159 Critics argue that the intervention authority has been 
left too vague, and will require clarification before it can be put 
to effective use.160 If this is so, it could hinder the effective 
functioning of one of the most innovative provisions of the Con-
vention. 
B. The Prevalence of Internal Displacement and Regional Coop-
eration 
Several influential conditions present in Africa while the 
Kampala Convention was under consideration can be viewed as 
significant to the instrument’s creation and eventual ratifica-
tion. Specifically, the prevalence of internal displacement in 
Africa and the cooperation between member states, the U.N., 
and other regional actors were determinative of the Conven-
tion’s viability.161 
1. The Prevalence of Internal Displacement Across Africa 
The drafters have indicated that the Convention was formed 
amidst recognition of the need to address the disproportionate 
number of IDPs in Africa, in light of the gap in protection due 
                                                                                                             
 158. “The AU has not yet exercised its right to intervene as envisaged in 
Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act, which does not require the consent of 
member states,” though the AU has exercised interventions with the state’s 
consent. Id. at 43–44. For more on this generally, see id. 
 159. See infra Part II.A.1. Thus far, the “assumption has been that the AU’s 
right to intervene can be equated to the use of force. This assumption is based 
on the fact that, in order to exercise this right, the AU has made provisions 
for the establishment of an armed force whose responsibility includes inter-
vention as contemplated in the Constitutive Act. Less intrusive means of in-
tervention are listed outside this right.” Ntombizozuko, supra note 103, at 17. 
 160. “Further, the AU may be barred from exercising this right as it ap-
pears that the principles of sovereignty, non-interference, and territorial in-
tegrity of the AU member states are interpreted restrictively. The AU must 
deal with these issues before an attempt to exercise the right to intervene is 
made.” Id. at 1. 
 161. This list is not meant to be exhaustive. There are many other factors 
that contributed to the AU’s ability to create the Convention in 2009 and to 
its ratification in late 2012, but these stand out to the author as noteworthy 
and, at least, a starting point. 
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to the absence of a binding international legal regime.162 While 
displacement exists in every region of the globe,163 the problem 
is more widespread in Africa than on any other continent.164 As 
a continent, Africa had the highest number of internally dis-
placed persons in the years leading up to the AU Executive 
Council order to draft the Convention.165 IDPs also vastly out-
number refugees in Africa.166 Displacement thus permeates life 
on the continent in a way that it does not in other areas where 
the issue is not as prevalent, and the issue was familiar and 
tangible to heads of state and the drafters in a way that it may 
not have been in a region not experiencing the phenomenon on 
such a large scale.167 
Recognition of the severity of internal displacement on the 
continent was accordingly a major impetus behind the Conven-
tion.168 Indeed, as expressed in the Explanatory Note to the 
Convention, states parties created the document “conscious of 
the fact that the African continent has the largest number of 
refugees, internally displaced persons, and returnees.” 169  A 
perception of the commonality of internal displacement in Afri-
ca appears to have fostered the framing of internal displace-
                                                                                                             
 162. Explanatory Note on the African Union Convention for the Protection 
and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Conven-
tion), AFR. UNION,  
http://www.internaldisplacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/5A1
FC4CC9028079DC12577450048DE13/$file/Kampala%20Convention%20-
%20Explanatory%20Note.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2013) [hereinafter Ex-
planatory Note]. 
 163. In addition to Africa, there are IDPs in countries on every inhabited 
continent of the globe. Colombia is the country with the most IDPs (with 
around 4 million IDPs), followed by Iraq (with an estimated 2.5 million IDPs), 
Turkey (with over a million IDPs), and India (with an estimated 500,000 
IDPs). Global Overview, supra note 59, at 8–9. 
 164. At least twenty-seven of Africa’s fifty-four countries have internally 
displaced persons, with at least 40% of the world’s 28.8 million IDPs located 
in African countries. Africa, FORCED MIGRATION ONLINE, 
http://www.forcedmigration.org/browse/regional/africa.htm (last visited Aug. 
20, 2013); see also Kampala Convention, IDMC, supra note 34. 
 165. Africa, FORCED MIGRATION ONLINE, supra note 164. For more on the 
drafting process, see infra Part II.A.1. 
 166. Analysis: African IDP Convention, supra note 148. 
 167. Giustiniani, supra note 46. 
 168. Solomon, supra note 38, at 83–84. Indeed, the preamble presents the 
Convention as a vernacular solution for a problem that disproportionately 
affects Africa. Kampala Convention, supra note 33, pmbl. 
 169. Explanatory Note, supra note 162. This document is nonbinding. 
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ment as a distinctly African problem, which likely facilitated 
the cooperation necessary to bring the Convention into being.170 
It is difficult to say whether the Convention would have gar-
nered the same political support without such widespread 
awareness resulting from its omnipresence. 
2. Cooperation Between African States, the U.N., and Other 
Regional Actors 
Cooperation between African States and outside actors was 
also influential in the creation of the Convention. Although ini-
tiated by the AU Executive Council and coordinated by the AU 
Secretariat, the Kampala Convention was created during a 
five-year process involving a comprehensive team of AU mem-
ber states, U.N. representatives, legal experts, and a variety of 
civil society and regional organizations.171 
The AU ensured that the project had the support, participa-
tion, and commentary of a wide range of regional actors.172 In-
deed, the drafting and negotiation of the terms of the Conven-
tion were inclusive and cooperative processes, characterized by 
the involvement and input of partner organizations and ex-
perts.173 UNHCR was involved and provided support through-
out the process.174 CSOs were included in the negotiations, of-
fering comments on issues felt to be inadequately addressed in 
initial drafts. 175  NGOs had (limited) involvement as well. 176 
                                                                                                             
 170. See id. 
 171. Solomon, supra note 38, at 85 n.2. The African Union Executive Coun-
cil created the team in response to a decision in 2004 for the AU Commission 
to collaborate with relevant cooperating partners to ensure that IDPs would 
be provided with appropriate legal protection. Abebe, supra note 38, at 32. 
 172. Abebe, supra note 38, at 33 (the author comments that involving out-
side actors in this process was “notable”). 
 173. Id. at 31–41. 
 174. Volker Türk, Restructuring Refuge and Settlement: Responding to the 
Global Dynamics of Displacement, 28 REFUGE 117, 124 (2011). 
 175. Forced Displacement, Citizenship and Statelessness in Africa: Report 
of a Civil Society Consultation on African Union Mechanisms and the Protec-
tion of Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons and Citizenship Rights 6–9 
(Kampala, Uganda, Oct. 19–20, 2009), available at 
http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/research_pdf/ConsultativeMeeting.10
2009.pdf. 
 176. On the role of NGOs, one scholar comments, “NGOs participated in the 
drafting process both within the framework of the Consultative Group and 
also by providing a written submission. It should, however, be stated that the 
role of NGOs was considerably limited,” as “very few African NGOs . . . have 
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NGOs and CSOs both play a vital role in assisting and protect-
ing IDPs in the field in Africa177 and are thus well situated to 
comment on the problem. Indeed, these organizations may be 
in a position to best represent the needs of IDPs and to make 
sure the IDPs’ position is heard. 178  The inclusion of these 
groups demonstrates the AU’s pragmatic approach to the crea-
tion of a Convention well suited to address the realities of dis-
placement on the continent. 
The AU also invited legal experts, acting in an independent 
capacity, to comment on the initial draft of the Convention.179 
Later drafts drew heavily upon their suggestions for structure 
and content.180 The input of these experts included robust de-
bate on the balance between the notions of state sovereignty, 
regional responsibility, and intervention.181 The contributions 
of these experts were significant; their suggestions directly re-
sulted in broadening the AU’s oversight role to allow for inter-
vention during “grave circumstances” causing displacement.182 
The inclusion of this provision highlights the value of a collabo-
rative drafting process that draws on the input of a variety of 
experts and represents various perspectives.183 
Additionally, the U.N. proffered much support of the AU’s 
development and leadership in Africa, which was significant to 
the formation of the collaborative climate in which the Conven-
tion was created.184 Even prior to the drafting process, the U.N. 
had encouraged the AU to craft regional solutions to displace-
                                                                                                             
sufficient expertise in humanitarian and forced displacement areas.” Abebe, 
supra note 38, at 36. 
 177. See Elizabeth Ferris, “The Role of Civil Society in Ending Displace-
ment and Peacebuilding” [Speech], BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, Mar. 13, 2008, 
available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2008/03/13-civil-
society-ferris. 
 178. “In some countries . . . [CSOs] play very important roles in monitoring 
IDP situations and often serve as fora for IDPs to make their voices heard. In 
some cases, [CSOs] are given formal roles in supporting solutions for IDPs.” 
Id. 
 179. Abebe, supra note 38, at 36. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 35. 
 182. Kampala Convention, supra note 33, art. 8. 
 183. See Giustiniani, supra note 46. 
 184. In 2005, for instance, the U.N. committed to partnering with the AU to 
bring positive developments to the continent. World Summit Outcome, supra 
note 54. 
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ment in Africa.185 And in 2006, the U.N. and the AU entered 
into a partnership to promote the AU; the U.N. Secretary-
General and the AU Commission Chairperson signed a declara-
tion, the main objective of which was “to enhance the capacity 
of the AU Commission and African sub-regional organizations 
to act as effective U.N. partners in addressing the challenges to 
human security in Africa.”186 The AU took the official position 
in these discussions that the U.N. system as a whole would 
benefit from the AU taking primary responsibility for “certain 
tasks on the African continent.”187 The agreement reveals a 
perceived “common commitment” to assist in “advancing Afri-
ca’s development and regional integration.”188 This support of 
the U.N. provided legitimacy to the AU as it grew into its role 
as a regional organization. 
The Kampala Convention shows that the AU addressed the 
continent’s displacement issues with a regional approach, im-
posing duties on states parties to seek the assistance of other 
states and regional actors when independently unable to meet 
the needs of the displaced, as well as duties on myriad non-
state actors. In addition, the AU was granted authority to in-
tervene in grave circumstances affecting the security of 
IDPs.189 
While this cooperative approach has limitations, the inter-
connected web of accountability which it weaves for regional 
actors makes it possible that future crises will be prevented 
and that the protection and assistance needs of those already 
                                                                                                             
 185. For example, in a 2001 Report to the Security Council, the U.N. Secre-
tary-General endorsed a regional solution to the issue of refugees and IDPs in 
Africa: “The response to this challenge should take into account the linkages 
that exist between the countries in the sub-region.” U.N. Secretary-General, 
Report of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Refugees and Internally Dis-
placed Persons Pursuant to the Resolution 1346, U.N. Doc. S/2001/513 (May 
23, 2001), ¶¶ 3–4. 
 186. Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation: A Framework for the Ten-Year Capac-
ity Building Programme for the African Union, G.A. Res. 61/630, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/61/630, Annex (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter Enhancing UN-AU Coop-
eration]. In the 2005 World Summit Outcome, the member states agreed to 
the development and implementation of a ten-year plan for capacity building 
with the AU. 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 54. 
 187. Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation, supra note 186. 
 188. Id. 
 189. As discussed above, this is pursuant to certain procedures; interven-
tion is by either the Assembly’s decision or by request of a state party for as-
sistance. See Kampala Convention, supra note 33, art. 8(1), (2). 
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displaced will be better met. It remains to be seen whether this 
approach will provide an effective alternative to traditional 
methods of protection. In the meantime, its very existence is 
beneficial to the building of intraregional cooperation, account-
ability, and self-sufficiency in Africa. 
III. OUT OF AFRICA: TRANSFERRING THE REGIONAL APPROACH 
TO THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES 
This approach to internal displacement, still nascent in Afri-
ca, has yet to be utilized by other regional organizations.190 
This section will apply the factors identified above to the cur-
rent internal displacement crisis in Syria. It will argue that 
despite differences in the regions and the regional organiza-
tions involved, a cooperative approach would be viable for the 
Arab League as well, and, if adopted, could provide relief for 
contemporary displacement crises such as the one currently 
ongoing in Syria. 
A. The Arab League’s Characterizing Principles and Objectives 
It was argued above that the foundational principles and 
characteristics of the AU were influential in the creation of the 
Kampala Convention and are reflected in its substantive provi-
sions.191 The principles and nature of the Arab League would 
likewise influence the character of an IDP convention and are 
thus relevant to the present inquiry. 
The Arab League was founded in 1945192 and is the world’s 
oldest existing regional organization.193 Comprised of twenty-
two member states,194 it is the Arab region’s most prominent 
                                                                                                             
 190. As noted, the Assembly of the Organization of American States passed 
a non-binding resolution encouraging member states to consider adjusting 
national laws to better protect and assist IDPs. See supra note 35. 
 191. See supra Part II.A. 
 192. See Pact of the League of Arab States, Mar. 22, 1945, 70 U.N.T.S. 248, 
252 [hereinafter “Arab League Pact”]. 
 193. Pinfari, supra note 39. 
 194. As discussed supra note 40, Syria has been suspended since late 2011, 
following an Arab League resolution to suspend the country if the govern-
ment failed to cease violent activity against civilians. See Batty & Shenker, 
supra note 40; MacFarquhar, Arab League Votes to Suspend Syria over 
Crackdown, supra note 25. The Arab League has nonetheless maintained 
involvement with seeking a solution to the Syrian conflict. See Bayoumy, su-
pra note 29. 
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and significant regional organization. 195  The League was 
founded following the Second World War, as states of the re-
gion struggled to emerge from the hegemony of colonizing Eu-
ropean powers.196 It was created as “part of a broad and ambi-
tious political project,” in a moment in which some involved en-
visioned “the creation of a single Arab state.”197 The organiza-
tion grew out of a time in which the region was seeking to rede-
fine itself, and in that sought both “unity and independence.”198 
Indeed, the foundational document, the Pact of the League of 
Arab States (the “Pact”), states that the organization was es-
tablished to “draw closer the relations between member 
states.”199 Going forward, League members were “to consider in 
a general way the affairs and interests of the Arab coun-
tries.”200 
Contrasting with this quest for unity is the Pact’s more prom-
inent emphasis on the principle of sovereignty.201 The preamble 
reveals this dichotomy between cooperation and independence. 
While states were to “direct their efforts toward the goal of the 
welfare of all the Arab States, their common weal,” that en-
deavor was to be undertaken only upon a “basis of respect for 
the independence and sovereignty” of member states.202 And 
while the Pact provides for a Council with some oversight func-
tion to give binding judgments on disputes between two states, 
those decisions only bind the states that accept them.203 This is 
one indication that the states parties sought to retain inde-
pendent authority at the expense of regional coexistence,204 a 
characterizing focus on sovereignty that has remained in the 
intervening decades.205 
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It has been argued that one explanation for the continued, 
near-constant conflict in the Arab region may be this presence 
of both sovereignty and pan-Arabism206 in the agenda of the 
Arab League.207 This dichotomy may cause “role conflict,” sty-
mying the development of a regional identity and thereby con-
tributing to regional conflict.208 Regardless of the merits of that 
position, this dual agenda should not be deemed fatal to the 
creation of a regional framework to address regional problems 
such as internal displacement. 
As explored above, the AU has sought to emphasize coopera-
tion without sacrificing respect for sovereignty,209 demonstrat-
ing that advancing a regional approach to internal displace-
ment need not come at the expense of relinquishing an empha-
sis on independence. It follows that while the Arab League has 
historically and contemporarily emphasized the sovereignty of 
its member states, such a stance would not necessarily be dis-
positive of a viable regional framework to address issues facing 
the region. The League could thus incorporate a focus on coop-
eration without losing its emphasis on sovereignty and inde-
pendence. This approach may appeal simultaneously to the 
strong sense of sovereign equality and to pan-Arabism.210 
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B. Key Principles and Limitations of an Arab League Conven-
tion on Internal Displacement 
1. Provisions of a Regional Approach to Protecting and Assist-
ing IDPs in the Arab Region and Application to the Current 
Situation in Syria 
For an effective convention to address the problem of internal 
displacement in the Arab region, the Arab League should repli-
cate the provisions that have been essential to the regional ap-
proach of the Kampala Convention. Specifically, the League 
should build into the document provisions emphasizing cooper-
ation between and among state parties and other regional ac-
tors,211 and establish a right of intervention for the AU in cases 
of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, similar 
to those provisions within the Kampala Convention.212 
If Syria was a party to a similar Arab League convention for 
the protection and assistance of IDPs, it would be obligated to 
bring its national laws into compliance with the convention and 
to fulfill those obligations in the case of displacement. For in-
stance, Syria would have a duty to fully cooperate with aid-
giving organizations. Neighboring states parties would be obli-
gated to assist if requested by Syria to help meet the needs of 
IDPs. In the event that the Syrian government proved unable 
to provide sufficient protection and assistance, the Arab 
League would have the authority to facilitate assistance and 
support from non-state actors, and to intervene on behalf of the 
displaced if the situation was deemed, by the other member 
states or by an established council, to be of such grave circum-
stance to warrant intervention.213 
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In the current situation, Syria would likely be found in viola-
tion of its substantive obligations to assist and protect its IDPs. 
Both sides of the conflict would be in violation of Article 7, 
which prohibits members of armed groups during armed con-
flict from, inter alia, “hampering the provision of protection and 
assistance to internally displaced persons under any circum-
stances,” “impeding humanitarian assistance and passage of all 
relief consignments, equipment and personnel to internally 
displaced persons,” and “attacking or otherwise harming hu-
manitarian personnel and resources or other materials de-
ployed for the assistance or benefit of internally displaced per-
sons.”214 It is unclear whether either the Syrian government’s 
reaction or that of opposition forces would differ if the country 
were under a legal obligation to cooperate with humanitarian 
actors seeking to render assistance. Further, the confirmed use 
of chemical weapons in Syria215 would meet the threshold for a 
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cal Methods of Warfare and other relevant rules of customary inter-
national law . . . The Secretary-General reiterates that any use of 
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finding of grave circumstances warranting intervention by the 
Arab League.216 Whether actual or effective intervention fol-
lowed would hinge on decisive and cooperative action by the 
Arab League delegates,217 as well as on the existence of suffi-
cient resources and will on the part of the Arab League to use 
force for this purpose.218 
Such a convention would add a critical alternative to the cur-
rent inadequate options for the displaced in Syria. It would ob-
ligate Syria, its fellow Arab states, and the Arab League to ad-
equately provide for the IDPs whose needs currently are se-
verely unaddressed.219 As there have been documented viola-
tions of international criminal law,220 the League could exercise 
a right of intervention (if codified) and use force to intervene to 
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protect IDPs suffering from these violations. While it is impos-
sible to know if any substantive protections afforded by such a 
convention would be effective if applied to the current situation 
in Syria, it would at least provide an alternative to the bleak 
options that now exist. 
2. Learning from the Kampala Convention’s Limitations 
The first limitation of the Kampala Convention discussed 
above was states’ reluctance to ratify. Unpacking the likely 
reasons behind that reluctance promotes an understanding of 
the ways a regional approach could be improved upon when 
transferred beyond the AU. The hesitation among AU member 
states to ratify the Convention has been attributed to political 
hesitations with regard to certain obligations that would result, 
such as compensating the displaced and the obligation to bring 
national guidelines into compliance, which may be costly and 
unpopular domestically.221 Concern over the requisite financial 
resources and weak political will necessary to bring domestic 
laws into compliance with a convention’s guidelines could be 
expected to hinder ratification; 222  few Arab states currently 
have domestic provisions to protect the displaced.223 The Arab 
League would therefore likely face hesitations due to economic 
hindrances and political hesitations related to requiring these 
domestic changes, which would hold up the ratification pro-
cess.224 To counter that, the League could encourage states to 
replicate steps taken during the AU’s ratification process, in-
tended to induce ratification without sacrificing substance. For 
instance, ratification in the Gambia was subsequent to an ini-
tiative to inform national assembly members about the sub-
stance and expected benefits of the Convention.225 In the face of 
certain hesitations, the Arab League would better ensure rati-
fication by maintaining involvement and support in this way in 
all steps of the process. 
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The impact of the convention would hinge on states parties’ 
compliance, and in the face of a state party’s noncompliance, on 
the Arab League’s ability to compel compliance via an oversight 
function. The Arab League should therefore incorporate a 
strong oversight function to avoid possible limits on its ability 
to ensure compliance with an IDP convention. Critics have 
voiced concern that the oversight function of the Kampala Con-
vention may be weak.226 While the Arab League’s Council does 
have monitoring functions and can issue binding judgments, 
those decisions only bind the states that accept them.227 A pro-
vision that requires ratifying states to consent to being bound 
by an oversight body might render this a non-issue. It is note-
worthy that the oversight mechanism in the Kampala Conven-
tion228 does not appear in previous African conventions; the 
provision was negotiated for the first time at the AU summit at 
which the Convention was adopted.229 This suggests that the 
Arab League could incorporate a more strict oversight mecha-
nism than that articulated in previous League documents and 
in the Pact. 
Finally, a right of intervention similar to that codified in the 
Kampala Convention would likely be problematic for the Arab 
League, steeped as the organization is in an emphasis on state 
sovereignty. To cure the issue of vagueness, for which the AU’s 
intervention power has been criticized, it would be beneficial 
for the League to define the intervention right and to detail the 
scope, procedures, and substance of that right. It also bears 
keeping in mind that, while the intervention provision of the 
Kampala Convention is based in the intervention right codified 
in the AU’s Constitutive Act, the provision in the Convention is 
seen to be an expansion of the authority as it appears in the 
Constitutive Act.230 A similarly activist approach could be em-
ployed by the drafters of an Arab League IDP convention to 
create an effective right of intervention on the part of the 
League that has no precedent in prior League documents. 
In light of these potential obstacles, the Arab League should 
proactively seek to incorporate measures to strengthen the pos-
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sibility that such a convention would be drafted, widely sup-
ported, and subsequently abided. Following the lead of the AU 
provides a solid starting point for such an approach. 
C. The Prevalence of Internal Displacement and Regional Coop-
eration 
Despite real ideological and practical hurdles that the Arab 
League would face in the crafting of an instrument to address 
internal displacement with a regional framework, the preva-
lence of internal displacement in the Arab League and the co-
operation between member states, the U.N., and other regional 
actors would work in the League’s favor and could bolster the 
possibility of successfully developing such a document. 
1. The Prevalence of Internal Displacement in the Arab Region 
The degree to which internal displacement exists in Africa 
was shown to have been of major importance to the AU’s ability 
to create and encourage ratification of the Kampala Conven-
tion.231 This prevalence allowed the AU to couch the discussion 
of displacement in terms of the phenomenon as an “African 
problem” and the Convention as an African solution. However, 
it is worth noting that the Convention was crafted amid a 
downward trend in African displacement.232 While Africa con-
tinues to have the highest number of displaced persons, the 
continent has seen the number of displaced drop since 2004.233 
So while displacement has to a large degree been characterized 
as an “African problem,” that characterization does not need to 
become an excuse for this issue to not be taken up by other re-
gions’ organizations. 
Indeed, the Arab League could at this point adopt the issue of 
internal displacement as an Arab regional problem. Through-
out much of the twentieth century, many states in the region 
experienced displacement due to ongoing wars and unrest.234 
Indeed, most of the states in the League experienced phenome-
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na of displacement at some point toward the end of the twenti-
eth century.235 
And, unfortunately, the case could be made that internal dis-
placement is becoming a twenty-first century “Arab region 
problem.” In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the 
number of IDPs tripled in the region due to multiple armed 
conflicts.236 The Middle East and North Africa experienced the 
highest percentage of increase in internal displacement of any 
region in 2012, with the number rising more than 40% that 
year and continuing to rise drastically throughout 2013.237 In-
deed, the situation of internal displacement is more prevalent 
now in the states of the Arab League than perhaps ever before. 
As the historic visibility of displacement in Africa allowed the 
AU to prioritize seeking a solution to the displacement prob-
lem, the Arab League should re-conceptualize the current dis-
placement crisis as an Arab problem, requiring cooperative, 
inclusive regional prioritization. Most states in the Arab region 
have experienced displacement relatively recently, with the 
last few years seeing an increase in displacement affecting the 
entire region. The Arab region is therefore situated to use this 
bleak situation as an opportunity to productively bind together 
to find a common solution to this now-common problem. 
2. Cooperation Between Arab States, the U.N., and Other Re-
gional Actors 
Cooperation between member states and with international 
organizations and non-state actors was central to the approach 
taken by the AU to successfully draft the Kampala Convention 
and bring it into force.238 Unfortunately, the Arab League has 
not benefited from a positive reputation for cooperation.239 The 
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League is considered problematic and unique, elements that 
may be characteristic of a region shaped by instability and a 
lack of cohesion;240 the states that comprise the organization 
are seen to have “deep-rooted ideological” differences.241 In con-
trast to newer regional organizations, the League has been 
characterized as incapable or at least unwilling to work as a 
force for change and cooperation in the region.242 It has been 
argued that this is due in part to the League’s founding “prin-
ciple of membership deriv[ing] from an ethnic nationalist iden-
tity—being Arab—rather than civic or geographic inclusion 
within a region,”243 which has effectively prevented the League 
from being a progressive, unifying influence.244 
The Arab League’s reputation for a lack of cohesion among 
members245 evokes concern that the League would be unable or 
unwilling to serve as a driving force to lead and guide the draft-
ing process, as the AU did in bringing the Kampala Convention 
to fruition, and to subsequently ensure its effectiveness. In-
deed, during its seventy-year existence, the Arab League has 
proved consistently weak in steering the Arab region in any 
particular collective direction.246 Most relevantly, certain ex-
amples tend to indicate the League’s ineffective efforts to halt 
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the Syrian uprising. In November 2011, for instance, the 
League drafted a peace plan requiring the Syrian government 
to cease hostilities.247 Syrian authorities accepted the plan, but 
recommenced hostilities again the next day.248 In response, the 
League “deployed observers . . . but their mission came to an 
abrupt end when a month later the Gulf countries pulled their 
members out,” citing the mission’s inability to bring “the perpe-
trators to account.”249  The League’s response to this breach 
may raise concerns about the League’s ability to effectively lead 
the region toward signature and ratification of such an instru-
ment and to subsequently compel compliance. 
However, pertinent recent examples also demonstrate active 
League involvement in seeking a solution to the Syrian conflict, 
which suggests that the League may be growing into a new role 
in the region.250 For example, the Arab League members have 
voted to suspend Syria’s membership in the League for the 
state’s violence toward civilians.251  The suspension allegedly 
resulted from delegates, “[a]larmed by the region-spanning up-
heaval of the Arab Spring demonstrations,” who sought “to 
head off another factional war like Libya’s, in which the group 
took the unprecedented step of approving international inter-
vention.”252  The League was commended for the decision,253 
with the action hailed as signaling a shift within the League: 
In acting against Syria, a core member of the Arab League, 
the group took [a] bold step beyond what had been a long tra-
dition of avoiding controversy . . . Previously, when the Arab 
League was more of a dictators’ club, cautious members . . . 
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put the brakes on any activism. But the uprisings appear to 
be rewriting that formula.254 
Following the decision to suspend Syria, the Arab League 
Chairman stated that the League’s goal was “to find a solution 
to the problem within an Arab framework;” the suspension was 
reportedly an attempt by the League “to walk a tightrope be-
tween bringing pressure to bear without bringing foreign mili-
tary intervention.”255 With such intent, the League reveals a 
determination to act effectively as a cooperative body for the 
good of the region, without relying on outside actors. Another 
Arab League diplomat involved in the decision told the press 
that the League did not want “some sort of a blank check that 
is given to the Security Council to try to take this issue in hand 
. . . [Rather, there is the belief that] if the regime comes under 
intense pressure from the Arab side, then [the regime] will 
make some changes.”256 Accordingly, the decision by League 
member states to suspend Syria showcases a more activist or-
ganization than it has traditionally proven to be. 
Further, and most significantly here, the League couched the 
decision to suspend as a regional response intended to bring 
about a regional solution to halt a perceived regional harm. 
This mirrors the approach taken by the AU in creating a con-
vention to address displacement in Africa. Finally, the League 
has demonstrated its ability for sustained engagement in 
bringing about a solution to this regional harm. Indeed, the 
League has been actively engaged in negotiating a political end 
to the Syrian conflict and has been committed throughout to 
ensuring that both sides of the conflict participate in the Gene-
va II peace talks.257 
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These examples showcase willingness on the part of Arab 
League member states to hold their regional neighbors ac-
countable and to distance member states not acting in accord-
ance with their norms. This is also an example of the regional 
organization deciding to take action instead of waiting on in-
ternational support. It has been suggested that this represents 
a new stage in the League’s role in the region.258 That remains 
to be seen. But, while it is still far from certain whether it 
would be possible to create a regional convention to prevent in-
ternal displacement and to protect and assist IDPs in the Arab 
region, these recent developments in the Arab League provide 
at least some suggestion that the atmosphere within the 
League may be well suited to consider the drafting of such a 
regional framework with an inclusive and cooperative ap-
proach. Such a convention would go a long way toward reinforc-
ing the emergence of a new Arab regional approach in which 
member states view each other as cooperative partners sharing 
similar experiences. 
If the AU’s experience with the Kampala Convention is any 
indication, the inclusion of legal experts and regional CSOs in 
all stages of the process would prove critical to the Arab 
League’s successful creation of a pragmatic IDP convention 
well tailored to the region’s displacement concerns.259 The par-
ticipation of independent legal experts would provide alternate 
perspectives that may prove beneficial to the League in seeking 
to overcome any obstacles that may be experienced due to the 
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4, 2013), http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/arab-league-backs-
geneva-2-peace-talks#ixzz2keDeSSrB; see also Arab League to Press Syria 
Opposition over Peace Talks, supra note 40. 
 258. MacFarquhar, Arab League Votes to Suspend Syria over Crackdown, 
supra note 25. 
 259. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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League’s traditional emphasis on sovereignty; these experts 
would be useful in the negotiation of substantive provisions, 
such as whether the convention should incorporate a right of 
League intervention, and if so, in what situations.260 The inclu-
sion of CSOs and NGOs could ensure that the provisions re-
spond to the needs of the region’s IDPs.261 Incorporating and 
giving a voice to these non-state actors would also importantly 
reveal that the League was taking a truly cooperative regional 
approach to the issue of displacement. 
The U.N.’s support of the Arab League in this endeavor 
would also be highly beneficial. As demonstrated, the AU re-
ceived significant support from the U.N. throughout the evolu-
tion of the Kampala Convention; that support has been noted 
as crucial to achieving the end result.262 There is no indication 
that the U.N. would not likewise support the Arab League in 
undertaking a similar drafting and negotiation process. Indeed, 
throughout the Syrian conflict, the U.N. has called attention to 
the plight of Syrian IDPs and appealed to the relevant parties 
to provide protection and assistance.263 The U.N. has also offi-
cially endorsed the Arab League’s efforts to cease conflict in 
                                                                                                             
 260. As discussed supra in Part II.B.3, the legal experts utilized by the AU 
had a large influence on the substantive provisions and encouraged the in-
corporation of a right of AU intervention in grave circumstances; this provi-
sion clearly implicates territorial integrity and state sovereignty. The legal 
experts that participated in the drafting of the Kampala Convention debated 
this issue robustly. Id. 
 261. For instance, the on-the-ground nature of CSOs render these organiza-
tions well suited and well equipped to 
monitor conditions of return, local integration or resettlement to an-
other part of the country for IDPs; conduct inquiries into reports of 
violations of IDPs’ human rights; investigate complaints particularly 
regarding compensation or restitution for property, and discrimina-
tion against returnees; monitor and report on the implementation of 
peace agreements with particular regard to their provisions for du-
rable solutions; and advise the government on the rights of IDPs. 
Ferris, supra note 177. 
 262. Abebe, supra note 38. 
 263. In a prominent example, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Human 
Rights of IDPs in August 2012 “called upon all Syrian authorities and parties 
to the conflict” to protect and assist IDPs, specifically urging the parties to 
pay due “attention to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,” and 
“remind[ing] parties to the conflict that IDPs are entitled to the rights and 
freedoms afforded to them under international law irrespective of their legal 
status.” Syria: Severe Internal Displacement Crisis, supra note 22. 
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Syria and to provide assistance to the country’s civilians.264 
Additionally, the U.N. has been instrumental in serving as a 
forum for the negotiation of a political solution to the conflict; 
in September 2013, the Security Council unanimously called 
for the Geneva II peace talks and various U.N. entities have 
subsequently supported the work of relevant actors, including 
the Arab League, in orchestrating that conference.265 This U.N. 
involvement suggests that the Arab League would be able to 
rely on this critical pillar of support as it pursued the creation 
of a convention to address internal displacement in the Arab 
region. 
The above analysis suggests that, despite the Arab League’s 
fundamental emphasis on sovereignty and a traditional lack of 
intraregional cooperation, significant factors such as the cur-
rent prevalence of displacement throughout the region and the 
recent action taken by the Arab League indicate that it would 
be possible at this time for the Arab League to draft an inclu-
sive convention addressing the concerns of a variety of regional 
actors and reflecting a shift toward regional cooperation and 
accountability. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note has examined factors present during the formation 
of the Kampala Convention and applied them to the context of 
the Arab League to consider whether transferring a regional 
approach beyond Africa could be a viable solution to internal 
displacement crises in the Arab region. Some aspects of the Ar-
ab League make the creation and ratification of such a conven-
tion unlikely, such as the emphasis on sovereignty over region-
al unity and the characteristic disharmony between member 
states. However, it was argued that the current prevalence of 
the issue of displacement, the apparent cooperation of interna-
tional institutions, and recent indications that the Arab League 
may be taking a new, more robust leadership role in the region 
                                                                                                             
 264. This assistance has been provided since at least February 2012, when 
the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution confirming its support of the 
League’s efforts. G.A. Res. 66/253A, U.N. Doc A/RES/66/253A (Feb. 16, 2012). 
See also Press Release, General Assembly, Top UN Human Rights Official 
Says Member States ‘Must Act Now’ to Protect Syrian People, as Violent 
Crackdown Continues, in Briefing to General Assembly, U.N. Press Release 
GA/11206 (Feb. 13, 2012). 
 265. For information on this process, see supra note 25. 
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counteract these factors. Therefore, the time is ripe for the de-
velopment of such a convention. 
To increase the chance of success (in the form of cooperation 
during drafting, speedy and widespread ratification, and ulti-
mate compliance with the provisions of such a convention), 
drafters should include a provision that would create a regional 
web of accountability between states, non-state actors, and the 
Arab League itself, as appeared in the Kampala Convention. 
The League should also replicate the AU’s inclusive negotiation 
and drafting process, to encourage the input of the regional ac-
tors most in touch with the needs of IDPs. This inclusion would 
also be good regional policy and may bolster the chance of com-
pliance with the convention once implemented. 
The perception that the Kampala Convention was a solution 
to a uniquely African problem has been a powerful concept, 
which carried weight with international organizations, non-
state actors, and member states alike. Accordingly, the actors 
involved focused on the particular characteristics, trends, and 
causes of displacement in Africa to arrive at a document tai-
lored to the regional conditions of the phenomenon. Creating a 
similar convention, the Arab League could seek to reconfigure 
the issue of displacement as one that is also a problem experi-
enced uniquely in the Arab region. Thus framed, intraregional 
support for such a legal regime may be garnered and a conven-
tion that responds to the vernacular particularities of Arab in-
ternal displacement may develop. 
The most likely obstacle to the creation of such a convention 
by the Arab League may be the organization’s traditional focus 
on sovereignty at the expense of intraregional cooperation. 
However, recent activity of the League suggests that member 
states are starting to hold each other accountable to regional 
action and norms. In such a climate, delegates may well be 
willing to consider a cooperative approach to displacement that 
emphasizes regional accountability rather than individual 
state sovereignty. 
The AU has demonstrated that a regional approach to the 
problem of internal displacement is possible. While it remains 
to be seen how effective the Kampala Convention will be, the 
Convention serves as a model for other regional organizations 
to take the regional approach out of Africa and adapt it to fit 
the vernacular conditions of displacement in other regions. 
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Most immediately, the Arab League would do well to heed the 
AU’s example. 
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